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Disciplinary processes and the management of poor performance 
among UK nurses: bad apple or systemic failure? A scoping study 
This paper aims to use the findings of a scoping study to investigate the 
management of poor performance among nurses and midwives in the United 
Kingdom within the context of rising managerialism in the UK National Health 
Service (NHS) and globally. The management of poor performance among 
clinicians in the NHS has been seen as a significant policy problem. There 
has been a profound shift in the distribution of power between professional 
and managerial groups in many health systems globally. We examined 
literature published between 2000 and 2010 to explore aspects of poor 
performance and its management. We used Web of Science, CINAHL, 
MEDLINE, British Nursing Index, HMIC, Cochrane Library and PubMed. 
Empirical data is limited but indicates that nurses and midwives are the 
clinical groups most likely to be suspended and that poor performance is often 
represented as an individual deficit. A focus on the individual as a source of 
trouble can serve as a distraction from more complex systematic problems.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of managerialism within public services and particularly healthcare 
systems has been noted globally. This paper investigates one possible 
manifestation of the conflict between managers and the healthcare 
professions and the state’s encroachment into professional regulation by 
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examining the findings of a study of the management of poor performance 
among nurses and midwives in the United Kingdom (UK). It interprets these 
findings within critical policy literature on the changing power relationships 
between clinical professionals and the state and its managerial agents. It is 
based on a scoping study commissioned by the National Clinical Advisory 
Service (NCAS), part of the UK National Patient Safety Agency, into the 
management of poor performance and focuses on current practice regarding 
the suspension and disciplining of nurses and midwives within NHS 
organisations and by the UK regulator, the Nursing and Midwifery Council 
(NMC). Two policy-orientated questions are explored in this paper:  
1. What evidence is there that the management of poor performance in 
healthcare organisations acts as a mechanism to control the traditional 
autonomy of clinical professions – in this case nurses – by the managerial 
structure of such organisations? In other words, do managerial groups tend to 
act in their own structural interests around the area of the discipline of 
nurses? 
2. How far, in government policy guidance, formal organisational procedures 
and actual practices within the NHS and those undertaken by the NMC is 
‘poor performance’ understood in terms of system failure or of individual 
disposition and culpability? 
Background 
The management of performance issues in nursing and midwifery takes place 
in the UK in a highly politicised context and in an international setting where 
the power of traditional professions has come under increasing challenge with 
claims of the ‘proletarianisation’ of medicine for example {McKinlay, 1985 
#3313}. We will discuss the three main aspects of this context: the rise of 
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managerialism or New Public Management (NPM) in healthcare; the 
increasing involvement of central government in the measurement—and 
management— of clinical performance and changes to the regulation of 
nursing and midwifery. 
Conceptual and policy context 
The new public management project and healthcare 
The term 'new public management' (NPM) was originally coined in 1991 to 
describe managerial reform in public services promoted with increasing vigour 
initially by Neoliberal governments, such as the Regan and Thatcher 
governments, from the 1980s to the present. Central to the concept of NPM is 
the notion that public sector managers, like their private sector counterparts, 
should be 'free to manage' {Hood, 2000 #2946}. This has offered managers 
an explicit mandate to redraw the frontiers of control between themselves and 
health professionals. Instead of working alongside them—or even supporting 
their work—managers were invited to believe that they should have the power 
to manage them. The loss of power of the health professions is part of a 
global decline in the power of professional groups in the face of the state and 
capitalist institutions {Krause, 1996 #2919}. 
A number of arguments have been advanced by critics of professionalism 
including that professions protect their own interests and cannot be trusted to 
deal with poor performance in their ranks {Freidson, 1970 #2645}. Such 
critiques of professionalism have paved the way for the bureaucratisation of 
professions alongside the 'attenuation of professional self regulation' 
{Harrison, 2007 #2944 p 251} p 251. These processes can be demonstrated 
by understanding recent changes in professional control within the UK NHS 
as part of a wider movement. 
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Central control of professional performance within health systems 
Timmermans and Berg have identified the rise of a drive toward the 
standardisation of medical practice across the United States {Timmermans, 
2003 #2733}. Similarly in the UK, Government control over the activities of 
health professionals has been increased by the rise of agencies and 
mechanisms of scrutiny and standardisation. The Labour Government 
published the first Performance Ratings for NHS acute Trusts in 2001. This 
was followed by enforcement of various targets for performance. Some have 
seen such scrutiny as a weapon in a long-running battle between doctors and 
health service managers {Degeling, 2003 #2731 p.650}  
Changes in nursing and midwifery regulation 
A second area where commentators have identified the encroachment of the 
state into professional affairs has been state endorsed professional self-
regulation {Allsop, 2002 #3148}. In 1998 the UK Labour government 
undertook a review of the regulation of nurses and midwives. Their report was 
highly critical of nurse regulation. As a result the United Kingdom Central 
Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting was replaced in 2002 by 
the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC). This was as part of an overarching 
reform of professional regulation with increasing powers moving to the 
executive function away from the professions. The new body was to have 
additional powers to deal more effectively with misconduct, poor performance 
and health issues. An overarching body, the Council for Healthcare 
Regulatory Excellence (CHRE), was created in 2002 to regulate the 
regulators on behalf of the government with the power to recall cases where it 
considers the regulator to have been 'unduly lenient' {Council for Healthcare 
Regulatory Excellence, 2010 #2937}.  
The combination of these forces – the changing frontiers of professional 
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action and status, increasing central scrutiny and control of health service 
activity and legislation which has changed self-regulation of the clinical 
professions – have reshaped relations between health service managers and 
clinical staff in many developed countries. The power of the medical 
establishment has enabled it to resist this challenge to some extent {Salhani, 
2009 #2790}. Nursing and midwifery, however, despite representing a larger 
workforce in every industrialised country, does not have access to such power 
and therefore has a greater vulnerability to managerial action {Traynor, 1999 
#528;Nelson, 2006  #2922}. Strong and Robinson give a detailed account of 
such a loss of influence as a result of changes to management structures 
{Strong, 1990 #8} and many have identified lack of power and status in 
nursing as leading to horizontal violence  
THE STUDY 
Design 
Our brief was to gather available evidence about the current management of 
poor performance among nurses and midwives within the UK NHS and by the 
nursing regulator. In order to do this we undertook a broadly thematic review 
{Barnett-Page, 2009 #3147} of available literature and analysed publicly 
available NMC case reports {Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2010 #2924} 
from the most recent 6 months (November 2009-April 2010). This paper 
focuses on the literature review.  
Search strategy 
A search of both published and grey literature was undertaken.  A search 
strategy was devised to ensure access to as wide a scope of the available 
literature as possible.  
Inclusion/exclusion criteria:  
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Pilot work had alerted us to a possible scarcity of literature on this topic 
therefore we placed no restriction on the type of literature and no research 
quality or design criteria were used.  
Databases searched:  
The following databases were searched: Web of Science, CINAHL, 
MEDLINE, British Nursing Index, HMIC (Health Management Information 
Consortium), Cochrane library and PubMed. All abstracts of the articles 
retrieved from the initial extraction process were read carefully and if matching 
the topic criteria were included.  Efforts were made to obtain all relevant 
studies. Some 7 electronic databases and 11 Internet sites were searched. 
Journals expected to be of importance, the Journal of Nursing Management, 
Nursing Times and Nursing Standard were hand-searched and the authors 
also used the data collected by the National Audit Office, the NMC and 
Department of Health. 
Keywords:  
Our search terms are shown in Table 1: 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Languages and dates search:  
We searched English language papers though these could be published 
internationally. Because our brief was to identify current evidence we retrieved 
papers published only from 2000 to April 2010 when the search was carried 
out. 
RESULTS OF THE SEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
The search process produced 6137 references not including duplicates.  After 
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examination of abstracts and in some cases the whole publication by two 
members of the team, 146 were considered relevant to the review. However 
there were relatively few studies directly addressing the ways in which poor 
performance is handled among nurses and midwives, giving an indication of 
the lack of a body of research on the topic. The literature discovered was so 
diverse in character and small in volume that only the broadest thematic 
analysis was undertaken.  
Lack of data on suspensions 
Because no centrally collected data existed on UK suspensions we had to rely 
on other sources of data and a number of research studies, some of which 
were more than five years old in order to gauge the size of the problem. The 
National Audit Office (NAO) report {National Audit Office, 2003 #2833} on the 
management of poor performance of clinicians in NHS hospital and 
ambulance trusts was the only recent major national study on the topic. The 
study found that between April 2001 and July 2002, 562 nurses and midwives 
were suspended for at least one month. This amounted to 53% of total NHS 
staff suspensions. The average gross annual cost of a suspension of a nurse 
or midwife was £17,600 (at 2001-2 prices). The average length of suspension 
was nineteen weeks. Fewer than 20% were suspended for reasons of 
professional competency while 45% were suspended in relation to 
professional conduct issues and 20% for personal conduct reasons.  At the 
end of the suspension 27% resigned or retired, 44% returned to work 18% of 
these without any imposed restriction and 29% were dismissed. Some 1063 
clinical staff were excluded for at least one month between April 2001 and 
July 2002 at an estimated gross annual cost of £40M. Of these, nurse or 
midwife suspensions accounted for approximately £10M of the total cost. It is 
possible that numbers of suspensions underestimate disciplinary action for 
performance issues as a whole as there are many disciplinary cases which do 
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not involve suspension either because staff are disciplined whilst continuing to 
work or because staff are on sick leave or pressured to resign {Cooke, 2006 
#2853}. 
Murray examined the experience of suspended nurses {Murray, 2005 #2838}. 
Her research involved a survey of nurse suspensions known to the Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN) in England during 2002, an audit of 637 sets of 
RCN Counselling Service data, and analysis of individual interview and focus 
group data from a subset of 63 nurses who had experienced suspension. 
Survey results indicated that there were 207 known suspensions of RCN 
members in England in 2002, equating to 1 for every 1,500 members. Some 
45% of these were the result of complaints from colleagues.  Murray found 
that the majority of suspended nurses returned to work after the disciplinary 
hearing and only 18% were dismissed (though the detail of other outcomes is 
not known).  The length of suspension varied from two weeks to over six 
months and an inconsistent approach to the use of suspensions was 
discovered. Recent NMC data indicate that its investigating committee 
concluded that in 36% of the cases brought to it, there was no case to answer 
{Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2010 #2924}. Such figures suggest over-use 
of disciplinary procedures by managers.  
Use of suspension: final resort or first response? 
Guidance maintains that suspension should be the last resort to be used only 
where patient safety might be compromised yet suspensions appear to be 
used inappropriately. In 2006 the English Department of Health set out a 
consensus statement on good practice. The overriding advice was that patient 
safety should be the primary consideration, that healthcare organisations 
should have policies in place and act quickly when there are staff 
performance concerns and that unnecessary suspensions of practitioners 
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should be avoided {Department of Health and National Patient Safety Agency, 
2006 #2841}. Attempts to gauge the effect of such guidance, and actual 
practice, are hampered by the lack of obligation upon NHS trusts to collect 
this data. What evidence we have gathered points to the continuation of 
inappropriate individual disciplinary action and failure to address 
organisational shortcomings. The NAO study outlined above concluded that 
the majority of trusts (86 per cent) did carry out an initial investigation before 
making the decision to suspend a clinician. However, the rigour and quality of 
these varied.  Speedy suspension may be appropriate where patient safety is 
at risk, but in the majority of cases reported to the NAO by trusts, ‘patient 
safety was not an issue, and the decision to exclude is sometimes a knee-jerk 
reaction made by NHS management without sufficient investigation’ (p25).  
Although two thirds of Trusts in the NAO study based their procedures on 
guidance from the Department of Health, respondents in a quarter of the 
Trusts felt that this guidance was of little use considering it too lengthy, 
complex, or legalistic.  Some Trusts had developed their own guidance for 
initial investigations and the consideration of options prior to suspension. 
Some trusts also used the Arbitration Conciliation and Advisory Service 
(ACAS) guidance (issued in 1997) as the basis for local policy.  The lack of or 
confusion regarding guidance for nurse suspensions was found to have led to 
procedures that were open to individual manager interpretation and abuse. 
The report concluded that the management of suspensions and exclusions 
from work in hospital and ambulance trusts was inconsistent and sometimes 
extremely poor, with managers showing widespread ignorance of national 
guidance on the topic. There was also highly incomplete reporting of the costs 
of suspensions, with trusts consistently under-reporting this cost to the 
investigators.  
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Murray {, 2005 #2838} identified poor practice surrounding preliminary 
investigations with some nurses being suspended after a complaint was 
received without being told of the nature of the allegations. Her counselling 
audit results pointed towards psychological distress as higher in incidence 
and effect for nurses being investigated for alleged misconduct (whether 
suspended or still working) than for other working nurses. The likelihood of 
suspension appeared to increase for nurses who were aged over forty, and/or 
were male, and/or from a black minority ethnic group. Murray’s literature 
review included studies that linked suspension with bullying, often by 
managers and with low morale. Low morale was an emergent theme for pre-
suspension nurses in her study. Her interviews and focus groups revealed 
that staff shortages, increased workload, bullying and harassment, and 
discordant interactions with colleagues or managers increased the likelihood 
of complaints and as a consequence, suspension. The low number of 
subsequent dismissals called into question the need for many suspensions 
with their attendant psychological and financial cost. She found that 
managers’ varying interpretation of gross misconduct was a crucial issue. She 
recommended that disciplinary systems needed streamlining with better 
accountability.   
Cooke examined aspects of healthcare management and disciplinary 
processes through observation in three healthcare Trusts in the north of 
England. She also carried out interviews with ward sisters, staff nurses, 
directorate managers and others discussing any form of involvement in 
disciplinary procedures {Cooke, 2006 #2853;Cooke, 2006 #2853}.  Her 
informants reported that punishments were commonplace though not 
necessarily documented. It appeared that to avoid high numbers of 
disciplinary actions and high costs for disciplining nurses quasi-official 
procedures took precedence keeping the actual figures of poor performance 
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out of the public domain. Her respondents also remarked on an apparent 
defensiveness within NHS culture concerning this topic which she speculates 
was a result of the newly established self-governing Trusts whose 
managements were able to discipline and suspend staff based on their own 
guidelines rather than national ACAS guidelines.  
In spite of the tendency towards punitive use of discipline, there is some 
evidence that managers are uncertain about assessing competence. In a 
critical review of evidence and current practice in 18 Health and Social 
Services Trusts and 4 Health and Social Services Boards in Northern Ireland, 
Hamilton {, 2007 #2862} found that many managers found assessing 
performance difficult, and highlighted challenges to adequately defining poor 
performance. 
‘Bad apple’ or system failure? 
Guidance from the UK Departments of Health and ACAS on the management 
of poor performance and the use of suspensions from work has focused on 
encouraging organisational self-examination and urging employers to analyse 
the context in which apparently individual problems have arisen in order to 
identify possible system failures (see, for example, the Incident Decision Tree 
adapted by the NPSA from James Reason’s work reproduced in {Meadows, 
2004 #2839}). It is also widely accepted in studies of errors in nursing that 
most errors occurred not because nurses were reckless or lacked training but 
because organisational systems were not designed to prevent errors 
occurring {Oulton, 2003 #2863}. Our literature review supports this conclusion 
and we have found examples of individual suspensions where organisational 
and managerial factors appear to be stronger predictors of suspension than 
characteristics or performance of the individual nurse {Cooke, 2006 #2853}.  
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Despite widespread agreement about the importance of organisational factors 
in interpreting what constitutes ‘poor performance’ and in how it is managed, 
an individualistic conception of the problem – an individual nurse as ‘bad 
apple’ - still appears to dominate. NCAS literature, for example, shows 
awareness of the organisational background to performance issues though its 
definition of poor performance {National Clinical Assessment Service, 2010 
#2837} focuses on individual failings. The presentation of NMC case data also 
focuses on individual characteristics rather than organisational factors. It 
shows for example the frequently cited statistic that men are highly 
overrepresented in fitness to practice cases {Clover, 2010 #2923}. Our own 
data-analysis supports this. In the 6 months of NMC data that we reviewed it 
is apparent that male nurses accounted for nearly one third of cases while 
they represent only 11% of registered nurses. However, further analysis 
revealed that registered mental health nurses (RMNs), among whom men 
form a disproportionately large part of the workforce, were overrepresented in 
the context of all registrants (0.05 of all RMNs were the subject of cases 
compared to 0.03 of general nurses). This suggests that setting also plays a 
part in how ‘poor performance’ is identified and responded to. Other 
statements from the NMC continue to emphasise the body’s concern with ‘bad 
character’ traits of nurses and midwives {Santry, 2010 #2925} rather than 
organisational or systemic factors that might make ‘poor performance’ more 
likely or disciplinary action more likely to occur. Furthermore, although the 
NMC has recorded gender and setting, it has not recorded and does not 
report analysis of the ethic background of nurses called to its disciplinary 
hearings.  
DISCUSSION 
Limitations and strength of the evidence 
The key issue when reviewing evidence on the management of poor 
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performance among nurses and midwives is the lack of empirical data on the 
topic, as, in the UK, NHS trusts have not been obliged to report data on staff 
suspensions and the regulator has not reported ethnicity data. Paradoxically 
this is both a limitation of the study and compelling evidence of a problem.  
The small number of UK research studies on this topic point to variability in 
the way that poor performance is managed in NHS trusts with evidence that it 
has been managed in an unsatisfactory and costly way. It is hard to resist the 
conclusion that the lack of public data has worked to the advantage of 
organisations whose procedures may not bear scrutiny. Indeed, Cooke ’s 
work points to apparently considered failures of proper record keeping within 
organisations with managers adopting quasi-official approaches to disciplining 
staff. There is a great deal of personal anecdote, for example collected by 
Fagan – (Suspension Failure in the NHS (2004) http://www.suspension-
nhs.org/Reportonfailure.pdf), that also appears to point to poor managerial 
practice and managerial action designed to conceal processes. Managers are 
expected to represent and promote corporate objectives and to ‘lead’ in a way 
that transcends the limited interests of any individual professional group within 
the organisation. The implication is that because management as a group is 
free from professional interests, it can be seen as acting in the best interests 
of patients and the public, and is appropriate to take on the role of 
stewardship of public funds.  
There is a great deal of international literature, however, revealing that the 
authority of managers is contested by clinicians, particularly by doctors {Berg, 
2006 #2906} and that relationships between them are characterised by 
differing priorities and conflict. For many managers, the main issue is control 
over professionals, their spending and, increasingly, their activities and its 
apparent quality. In the United States insurance companies have been the 
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main drivers toward control of medical costs {Marmor, 1994 #705} but it was 
the introduction of an ‘internal market’ in the early 1990s and UK Labour 
government’s establishment of bodies of scrutiny that realised a vision of a 
health service totally visible to its managers. However, the perhaps welcome 
ability to monitor NHS performance that flourished in the UK under New 
Labour was matched with a less benign approach to performance 
management. NHS managers themselves have become increasingly 
vulnerable to central government pressure in the form of increased use of 
targets (which have encouraged some to ‘game’ out of fear of penalties 
{Bevan, 2006 #2927}), increased monitoring (the number of bodies inspecting 
hospitals was estimated in 2004 as over 100 {Lister, 2004 #2928}) and also 
the need to avoid being the centre of a media scandal, particularly those to do 
with failures to treat patients safely and with dignity {Womack, 2006 #2726}. 
Within such a context the management of poor performance can be seen both 
as a sanction that management can exercise over recalcitrant staff, for 
example whistleblowers, and as a recourse in the face of potential bad 
publicity over patient dignity issues, a way to demonstrate that such issues 
are being handled strongly. It could also be argued that, as members of a 
relatively weak professional group, nurses who are disciplined carry the 
individualised blame for organisational failings such as poor resources, poor 
training or target-driven cultures. Nurses have been seen to collude with 
organisational failures {Matthews, 2008 #3127}. From this perspective the 
solution of better training for managers managing poor performance does not 
address the systemic and political aspect of this problem.  
Implications of the review findings  
We have noticed an ambiguity in our review that while poor performance is 
widely acknowledged as a possible organisational issue, it is often defined 
and responded to in terms that are individualistic. We identified contextual 
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research that indicates that nursing and midwifery work is characterised by 
workplace stress and sometimes poor relationships with managers {Yildrim, 
2009 #2880} and cases where the individual appears to have been 
scapegoated for system failures {Cooke, 2006 #2854}. There also appears to 
be a widespread reluctance to report poor performance witnessed for fear of 
inaction, a general tolerance of mistakes and a fear of adverse effect on the 
person reporting {Currie, 2009 #2873}. Cases which suggest that whistle-
blowers have been treated unfairly seem to support this {McDonald, 2002 
#2899}. Public inquiries into healthcare ‘failures’, such as that which examined 
the unusually high numbers of deaths and reports of poor care at Stafford 
Hospital 2005-2008, have identified ‘system failure’ and a culture of secrecy 
and lies from managers in this trust. The first independent inquiry which 
reported in February 2010 claimed that the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust had 
become driven by targets and cost-cutting {BBC News, 2010 #2960}. 
Individual doctors and nurses who ‘whistleblow’ are often themselves 
disciplined by managers or their regulatory bodies (for example Dr Rita Pal at 
City General Hospital, North Staffordshire NHS Trust 
http://sites.google.com/site/ward87whistleblower/home). The status of 
whistleblowers however can swing dramatically from transgressive 
professionals problematic within their own profession to heroes in the media. 
For example, British nurse Margaret Haywood, who was struck off in 2009 for 
secretly filming patient neglect in a UK hospital was later reinstated by the 
NMC and subsequently named the Patients’ Choice at a national awards 
ceremony.  The NMC itself is under renewed pressure from CHRE to be seen 
to ‘protect the public’ effectively. Changes in the appointment of members of 
the NMC, to standards of proof required in its cases, to fitness for practice 
procedures and the explicit introduction of procedures for 'lack of competence' 
in addition to misconduct point to increasing political control over professional 
discipline {Allsop, 2002 #3148}. CHRE not only examines the management of 
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fitness to practice cases but has, since 2009, audited the regulators’ decisions 
in relation to complaints that are not referred for formal hearing. The NMC’s 
remit, is of course individual in focus, nevertheless its existing literature does 
not extensively explore or report on the possible contribution of organisational 
factors. 
CONCLUSION 
Our review has exposed disciplinary processes characterised by lack of 
systematic recording and reporting, instances of poor practice, and some 
examples of deliberate concealment. The size and variability in role of the 
nursing workforce, along with its lack of status and power, has rendered 
nurses vulnerable to less than optimal employment practice. It is hard to resist 
the conclusion that in many cases individual nurses have become the focus 
for chronic or widespread problems in a way that may enable organisations to 
continue to function without the expenditure of energy required to address 
complex systemic problems. The element of concealment within managerial 
practice and the exercise of power over relatively weak members of the 
workforce can be seen as the ‘shadow side’ of NPM practice that presents 
itself as rational, benign and free from vested interest. For professional 
regulators, disciplinary action placed under the public gaze functions as 
spectacle which continually sustains the positive regard that the professions 
need to maintain before the public and political leaders. With regulators 
themselves under scrutiny from inspectors it is in their interests to continue to 
use the language of individual ‘bad character’ and, perhaps unwittingly, 
collude in a theatre of punishment of transgressive individuals that provides a 
certain satisfaction and a distraction from more complex and hidden problems 
with the funding and delivery of health services. It appears that the full nature 
of such problems becomes apparent in inquiries after serious failures, such as 
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that which occurred in Stafford Hospital in the UK between 2005 and 2008.  
